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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Shammie L. Fisher ("Fisher" or "Insured") appeals from the district court's grant of

summary judgment dismissing her suit against Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance
Company ("Garrison" or "Insurer"). The district court granted summary judgment based on an
exclusion from coverage for any loss caused by faulty, inadequate or defective work. 1
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Fisher did not include in her Appellant's Brief a Course of Proceedings section. GaiTison

provides the following Course of Proceedings:
Plaintiff Fisher filed her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 27, 2015. (R., pp.
5-10.) The Complaint was brought against USAA Casualty Insurance Company. (Id) An
Answer to the Complaint was filed on July 10, 2015. (R., pp. 32-40.) The parties stipulated to
allow Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint and on July 21, 2015 the district court entered an
Order Granting Motion to File Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 41-42.) An Amended Complaint
was filed on July 27, 2015. (R., pp. 43-49.) Defendant USAA was substituted with Garrison.
(Id.) The Amended Complaint alleged two causes of action: breach of contract and breach of

the implied covenant of good faith of fair dealing. (Id.) On July 31, 2015, Garrison answered
the Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 71-79.)

Fisher also erroneously appeals from an alleged grant of summary judgment in favor of
Garrison that there was no coverage for her loss and the district court's denial of cross motions
for partial summary judgment relating to the intentional loss exclusion. Neither are proper issues
on appeal.
1

1

On September 1, 2015, Fisher filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a
ruling that the insurance policy provides coverage for her prope1iy damage losses. (R., pp. 8082.) In support of that Motion, Fisher filed an Affidavit (R., pp. 83-118), and a Memorandum
(R.,p.119-129).
Garrison filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on December 31, 2015 (R., pp.
150-151) seeking a ruling that the property damage loss was excluded from coverage by the
terms of two exclusions: intentional loss and faulty, inadequate or defective work. This Motion
was supported by an Affidavit with attached exhibits (R., pp. 152-174), and a Memorandum (R.,
pp. 175-190). On January 15, 2016, Fisher filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 191-202.) Garrison then filed, on January 25, 2016, a
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 203206.)
Following the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, held on February 1,
2016, the district court requested additional briefing on the following issue: "Where General
Exclusion l.h. is directly tied to activities of the insured, should the court consider it significant
that General Exclusion 2.c. is not directly tied to activities of the insured?" (R., pp. 207-209.)
Garrison filed its additional briefing on February 12, 2016. (R., pp. 210-214.) Fisher filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on February 16, 2016. (R., pp. 215-222.)
On February 25, 2016, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment as to Coverage granting summary judgment that there
was coverage for the loss, denying summary judgment on whether the intentional loss exclusion
2

applies and granting summary judgment that Fisher's loss was excluded from coverage by the
faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. (R., pp. 223-238.)
A Final Judgment was entered on March 25, 2016 dismissing Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint with prejudice. (R., pp. 239-240.)
Fisher timely filed her Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2016. (R., pp. 241-244.) Because
the Notice of Appeal included the old caption naming USAA as the Defendant/Respondent, an
Amended Notice of Appeal naming the correct Defendant/Respondent ("Garrison") was filed on
May 4, 2016. (R., pp. 245-248.)

C.

Statement of Facts.
The facts are not in dispute. The following Statement of Facts adds additional undisputed

facts and places other undisputed facts in context.
At all relevant times, Fisher was the owner of real property located at 2510 North 34th
Street, Boise, Idaho. (R., p. 83, ,r 2.) GaiTison issued a dwelling policy to Fisher applying to that
Described Location ("the Property"). (Id., p. 52.)
Beginning in January 2012 Fisher (as seller) and Ron Reynoso ("Reynoso") (as buyer)
negotiated a lease-to-purchase agreement for the Property. (R., p. 84, ,r 3.) The agreement is
reflected in: (1) a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 25, 2012 (R., pp. 8894); (2) a Counter Offer dated January 26, 2012 (R., p. 95.); (3) an Addendum dated January 28,
2012 (R., p. 96); (4) an Addendum dated February 8, 2012 (R., p. 97); (5) an Addendum dated
March 13, 2012 (R., p. 98); and (6) a Rental Agreement signed January 30, 2012 (R., pp. 105109) (collectively referred to as "Lease-Purchase Agreement").
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The Lease-Purchase Agreement was for a one year term beginning on March 15, 2012
and ending on March 31, 2013. (R., pp. 96; and 84, ,r 4.) In the event Reynoso was unable to
close before January 31, 2013, Fisher agreed to a month-to-month option to extend the LeasePurchase Agreement until a buyer closed on the Property, ending no later than September I,
2013. (R., p. 96.) Reynoso had the right to purchase the property during the term of the LeasePurchase Agreement for $153,000.00. (R., p. 95.) The Lease-Purchase Agreement expressly
allowed Reynoso to make improvements to the Property with the intent to sell it for a profit. (R.,
p. 96.)
The various documents making up the Lease-Purchase Agreement contain the following
relevant provisions regarding Reynoso' s right to improve the Property:
5.
Should the Buyer use any Sub-Contractors while making improvements to
this property, all disbursements are to be made by TitleOne and said SubContractors will be required to sign Lien-Waivers upon picking up their checks.
(R., p. 95);
Any improvements to the property made by the Buyer during the lease
8.)
period are forfeit to the Seller in the event the Buyer does not complete the
purchase transaction. Seller is not responsible to reimburse Buyer any costs of
improvements.
9.)
Buyer intends to make certain improvements to the property upon
possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit which might be prior to
the end of the lease period. The buyer is required to give a monthly update for
plans/upgrades. Buyer may market the property for resale prior to the end of the
rental period with the intent to sell the property.
(R., p. 96.)

4

6.

OWNER'S AGREEMENT:
b.
MAJOR REPAIRS. Tenant shall be responsible for all major
repairs to the premises
c.
MINOR REPAIRS. All repairs shall be paid by the tenant.
Owner shall be notified by tenant of the repair prior to the work being
done and repairs are to be accomplished in a workman like manner.

(R., p. 105.) (Bold in original.)

(9.)
INSPECTION. Tenant agrees that Owner or Owner's authorized agent
may enter the premises at reasonable times and intervals to inspect, repair, and
maintain the same, or to show the property to any prospective buyer, or any loan
or insurance agent. After notice of termination of this tenancy has been given by
either party, Owner may show the premises to any prospective Tenant.
(R., p. 107.) (Bold in original.)
In response to Requests for Admission, Fisher admitted the following:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

As early as January 25, 2015, Fisher knew that Reynoso was going to
make improvements to the Property. (R., p. 164.)
Within the first two months after executing the contract for Lease-toPurchase Fisher knew that the dwelling had been leveled. (Id.)
After learning that the dwelling had been leveled Fisher did not declare
Reynoso to be in breach of any agreement and refrained from doing so
because Reynoso promised to fix the damage he had caused and continue
to make rent payments. (Id., pp. 164-165.)
Fisher agreed to allow Reynoso time to fix the damage. (Id, p. 165.)
Prior to submitting a Proof of Loss in September 2013, Fisher did not
provide notice to Gan-ison that she considered the destruction of the
dwelling to constitute a loss under the dwelling policy. (Id.)

Reynoso promised Fisher that he would rebuild the dwelling. (R., p. 84, ,r 7.) As
promised, Reynoso began rebuilding the dwelling. (R., pp. 113; 118.) Fisher monitored and was
kept advised by Reynoso of the progress of the dwelling construction:

5

Jun B, 2012. 7:44 PM

.·:Bi,· Ro;,.·. , rE{c'd ·a-letter
:.ctQday f~om ·lqw'\:rtor . ::
:.>concrete.: It st_a,t~s a lien ·. /
( o,itl1e proper~y -ifit
\' paitiin 5 days. Tota! . ·::: <.':
,· o.v~1 ·is s1 .42f(94: .: ·.. ·

)snot .·.

..

ed

.

... ··_,_...

•

1

.

.

•

~

;

Sorry it will be paid
tomorrow had an issue
with a lender being on time
(R., pp.168-169.)

Sop 7, 2012, 2:48 PM

We start framing middle
next week. Car accdt put
me out of work 4 5 wks.
Was going 2 put on the
market oct 1 now mid
nov maybe sooner
(R., p. 170.)
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•

:

;

.·;-,

Mar 18, 2013, 5:13 PM

,.:' G·o~;,ch~bk·tpd~y\ Tt:iank':··.:,
,:_,~l_" ·._·. ·._:'.' _:, ·:· -~ ---~-. __ ;:,_, . .:. ·..,..-.'
Cool. What r ur thoughts
on the house ins thing?

Awesome
(R., p. 171.)
May 16, 2013, 6:13 PM

t need the loan/ also
very possible. I m still
giving u 5k either way.

7

.>._/./

Was dropping 700in
mlbx in morning. Other
300 next Tues. Been
back little over a wk.
getting ready to frame
2nd fir/already
started.Plan on putting
the
roof on in 2 wks/around
Mem day. Working w
(R.,p. 173.)
Jul 5, 2013, 9:25 PM

Hoping late next wek.
Yes on the meeting. Can
my invstr realtr john
hueger come
(R., 174.)

U bet! Also I noticed
tonight that some if ur
walls r missing that u out
up on the house.
The archt drew two story
walls for entry. I changed
it thru city and cut them.
(Id.)
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Fisher inspected the Property during construction.
Jun 14, 2012. 9:19 PM

(R., 169.)
The one year lease term began on approximately March 31, 2013. (R., p. 84, i[4.) Within
two months after the lease term began, Fisher was notified that "the entire home had been
destroyed by Mr. Reynoso, including the structures and fixtures therein." (Id. at ,r 5.)
In August 2013, Reynoso info1med Fisher that he was "walking away" from the house
and did not intend to complete construction. (R., p. 84, ,r 7; Appellant's Brief, p. 2.) At the time
construction ceased, the dwelling was incomplete and not habitable. (R., pp. 113; 118.) Fisher
did not make a claim under the dwelling policy for loss until September 27, 2013, nearly one and
one-half years after the dwelling was "destroyed". (R., p. 84, ,r 7.)

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The appellate rules contemplate that a Respondent set forth "additional" issues presented
on appeal if the issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete or raise additional
issues for review. I.A.R., Rule 3 5(b)(4). The district court granted Fisher partial summary
judgment that there was coverage under the policy. The district court denied Fisher's Motion for
Summary Judgment that the intentional loss exclusion did not apply and GaiTison' s Cross-

9

Motion for Summary Judgment that it did apply. Consequently, rather than three issues on
appeal, there is only one:
Did the district court properly grant Summary Judgment on the grounds that the
exclusion for faulty, inadequate and/or defective work excluded the property
damage loss?
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review.
1.

Standard of Review for Grant of Summary Judgment.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as
the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,
475-476, 50 P.3d 488, 490-491 (2002). This Court will review the record before the district
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de

nova whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
there exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d
1022, 1026 (1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c).

2.

Standard of Review for Denial of Summary Judgment.

It is well settled in Idaho that "[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is an

interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken." Dominguez, ex rel. Hamp v.

Evergreen RES., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005) (citation omitted). This rule is
not altered by entry of an appealable final judgment. Id.
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3.

Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation.

Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination of the effect of a
contractual provision is a question oflaw to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. THI Co., 140
Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). The interpretation of the legal effect of a policy of insurance is a
question of law over which this Court exercises de nova review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins.
Co., 137 Idaho 214, 46 P.3d 510 (2002). Interpreting contracts and applying the law to

undisputed facts constitutes matters of law which this Court reviews de nova. Polk v. Larrabee,
135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247,252 (2000).
B.

Analysis.
1.

Coverage is Not in Dispute Nor an Issue on Appeal.

Fisher sets forth the following issue on appeal:
1.
Did the district court err when it determined that the insurance
policy did not provide insurance coverage for Plaintiffs claimed losses to
real and personal property, granting summary judgment in favor of
Respondent?

(Appellant's Brief, p. 3.) The district comi did not grant summary judgment in favor of Garrison
that there was no coverage for the loss. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Fisher on that issue:
There is no genuine issue of any material fact; the direct loss to the residence is a
loss covered by the policy. The Court will grant partial summary judgment to
Fisher as to this issue.

11

(R., p. 229.) It is unusual for an Appellant to seek reversal of a grant of partial summary
judgment in his or her favor. This issue is not (or should not be) an issue on appeal. The only
issue on appeal is whether the property damage loss is excluded from coverage.

2.

The District Court's Denial of the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Regarding the Application of the Intentional Loss Exclusion is Not
Appealable.

The district court denied the cross motions for summary judgment on whether the
intentional loss exclusion applied to Fisher's loss. (R., p. 231.) Fisher appeals from that denial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4, 8, 11.)
Fisher cannot appeal from the denial of the cross motions for summary judgment.
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 13, 121 P.3d at 944. Asking this Court to review and overturn the
district court's denial of the cross motions for summary judgment should be rejected.
3.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment to Garrison that
Fisher's Loss to the Dwelling was Excluded by the Faulty, Inadequate or
Defective Work Exclusion.

The district court held that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion applies to
Fisher's loss as follows:
In this case, the Court has considered the language of the faulty,
inadequate or defective work exclusion, and finds that the language is clear and
unambiguous. There is an exclusion for any loss attributable to faulty, inadequate
or defective work. The Court finds that the loss here was caused directly by
faulty[,] inadequate or defective work as set fo1ih in the exclusion. The policy
excludes coverage for any and all faulty, inadequate and/or defective work.
Fisher has demonstrated that the direct loss was covered under the policy.
Garrison has shown that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion
applies to Reynoso' s incomplete construction work. ...
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(R., p. 236, 237.) The district court further held "that there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion applies; it does." (R., p. 237.)
Fisher agrees there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to application of the faulty,
inadequate or defective work exclusion.
Rather, based upon the undisputed facts of record and based upon the language of
the exclusion, the District Court should have found that the exclusion did not
apply and should have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant, not
Respondent.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12.)
Nor does Fisher dispute the district court's finding that the language of the faulty,
inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear and unambiguous. (R., p. 236.) Appellant
appeals from the district comi opinion "and seeks an order from this Court that, based upon the
uncontested facts and the plain language of the policy, there is no coverage for the losses and the
exclusions do not apply." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1.) (See also Appellant's Brief, p. 5, "In this
case, the clear language of the policy provides coverage for Appellant's loss".)
Because there is agreement between and among the district court, Fisher and Garrison
that the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion is clear and unambiguous and that the
material facts are undisputed, this Comi, using the rules of construction described below, can
determine whether the loss is excluded from coverage as a matter of law.
An insurance policy will generally be construed so that the insurer bears the burden of
proving that the asse1ied exclusion is applicable. Harman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
91 Idaho 719, 721, 429 P .2d 849, 851 (1967). "The language of standardized contracts must
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necessarily be somewhat general, in anticipation of varying circumstances and facts." Foster v.
Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806 (1984). "There is no obligation on courts to
countenance a tortured construction of an insurance contract's language in order to create an
ambiguity and thus provide an avenue for coverage where none exists." Mutual ofEnumclaw
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,236,912 P.2d 119, 123 (1996). "A contract must be
interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words used if the language is clear and
unambiguous." Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,622,249 P.3d 812,815
(2011).
Where policy language is found to be unambiguous, this Court is to construe the policy as
written, "and the Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor
make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to
the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69,205 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2009) (quoting Purvis v. Progressive Casualty
Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005)). Common, non-technical words are
given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage in order to effect the intent of the parties.
Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 69,205 P.3d at 205.
The de nova review by this Court is thereby limited to applying the clear and
unambiguous language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion to the undisputed
facts to determine whether Fisher's loss is excluded from coverage.

14

a.

Fisher's Loss is Excluded by the Plain Meaning of the Faulty, Inadequate
or Defective Work Exclusion.

Fisher's policy provides coverage for her dwelling. (R ., p. 60.) ThP pPril im:nrPrl ~g~in<:t
is the risk of direct loss to her dwelling if that loss is a physical loss to the property. (Id. at p.
63.) (Appendix A.) A "loss" is generally defined as:
3. Insurance. The amount of financial detriment caused by ... an insured
property's damage, for which the insurer becomes liable.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Ed., p. 963. There is no dispute that Fisher suffered a direct,
physical loss to her property - an incomplete, uninhabitable house.
The policy excludes from coverage any loss to prope1iy caused by any of the following:
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation,
remodeling, grading, compaction;
of part or all of any property whether on or off the Described Location.
(R., p. 66.) (Appendix A.) The loss here resulted from faulty, inadequate or defective
workmanship, repair, construction, renovation and/or remodeling of the dwelling, leaving it, to
her financial detriment, in an incomplete state.
The relevant terms in the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion have the
following common, non-technical definitions used by laymen in daily use:
I.
2.
3.

Inadequate not adequate; insufficient
Defective - having a defect; faulty
Faulty- containing a fault or faults; imperfect
a.
Workmanship the quality of such art, skill or technique
b.
Repair - to restore to sound condition after damage or injury; fix;
the work, act or process of repairing
15

c.
Construction - the act or process of constructing; the state of being
constructed; the way in which something is put together
d.
Renovation to make new; to restore to a previous condition, as
by remodeling
e.
Remodeling - to remake with a new structure
WEBSTER II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 558,295,409, 1272, 939,242 and 937 (1999).
The undisputed facts show that the buyer/lessee Reynoso was to make certain
improvements to the dwelling. By definition, improvements involve workmanship, construction,
renovation and/or remodeling. Those improvements were not completed and were therefore
inadequate, defective or faulty. Any loss based on "certain improvements" to the dwelling is
excluded by the plain language of the exclusion.
In the process of improving the property for resale (the Lease-Purchase Agreement does
not limit the improvements), Reynoso tore down, or as Fisher labels it "destroyed" the dwelling.
By definition, this also involves construction (demolition is a process of construction),
renovation (demolition is a process related to renovating existing structures), and remodeling
(demolition is part and parcel of remodeling). After the demolition/destruction of substantial
portions of the dwelling it was inadequate (not adequate for or unequal to the purpose of being a
dwelling) and defective (wanting in something, incomplete, lacking a paii, deficient) and faulty
(not fit for the use intended). Any loss based on "destroying" the dwelling is excluded by the
plain language of the exclusion.
Reynoso began rebuilding the dwelling in order to, as Fisher states, "repair" the damage
to the dwelling. Moreover, the undisputed facts show that Reynoso intended to improve the
dwelling for resale and profit. By definition and admission, rebuilding the dwelling involves
16

workmanship, repair and construction. Reynoso did not complete the construction of the
dwelling or complete the repair of the damage, making that workmanship, repair and
construction inadequate, defective and faulty. Any loss based on failing to rebuild or repair the
dwelling is excluded by the plain language of the exclusion.
Regardless of the words used by Fisher to describe the causes of the loss, applying any of
those causes to the plain meaning of the exclusion supports the application of that exclusion to
Fisher's loss. The failure to complete the improvements, the demolition of the dwelling, the
repair of the damage and construction of those repairs and the failure to complete the
improvements or rebuild the dwelling were losses caused by faulty, inadequate or defective
workmanship, repair, construction, renovation and/or remodeling of pmi or all of the dwelling.
The district court correctly ruled that the plain meaning of the exclusion applied to and
excluded Fisher's loss. The district court should be affirmed.
b.

The Words, Terms, and Conditions Fisher Seeks to Add to the Exclusion
Cannot Preclude Application of the Exclusion.

Fisher argues that the faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion does not apply
because she did not authorize Reynoso to destroy the dwelling, the destruction was not done at
her direction or done by her, she had no knowledge that Reynoso had "leveled" the dwelling, and
she did not hire or have a contractual undertaking with her tenant to do the work or to repair the
damage. Each of these arguments is made to avoid the application of the exclusion and requires
adding words, terms, or conditions to the exclusion and ignore the plain meaning of the words
actually used in the exclusion.

17

When analyzing the clear and unambiguous language of the faulty, inadequate, or
defective work exclusion, this Court is constrained to construe it as written. See Armstrong, 147
at 69, 205 P.3d at 1205. This Court cannot add words to the contract of insurance to either create
or avoid liability. Id. The faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion has no language that
Fisher authorize, direct, have knowledge of, perform herself, or hire out to a third person. To
engraft these words, terms, and conditions onto the clear and unambiguous language violates
long-established rules of contract construction. It fails to construe the policy as written. Adding
words, terms and conditions creates a liability not assumed by Garrison. Fisher's request to add
these words, terms or conditions should be rejected.
Support for not adding Fisher's words, terms, or conditions to the faulty, inadequate, or
defective work exclusion is found in the presence of similar words and conditions in a different
exclusion (intentional loss) and the absence of those terms and conditions in the subject
exclusion (faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion). The intentional loss exclusion in
Fisher's policy provides:

h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act
committed:
(1) by or at the direction of you or any person or
organization named as an additional insured; and
(2) with the intent to cause a loss.
(R., p. 66.) (Appendix A.) There is no "by or at the direction of' the insured language in the
faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion. Id.
As the district court held:
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The conclusion that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion
provision is unambiguous is further supported by reviewing the language of the
intentional loss provision. In that exclusion, whether an intentional loss was
excluded depended expressly upon \Vhether the loss arose out of an act committed

"by or at the direction of the [insured]". The faulty, inadequate or defective work
exclusion provision makes no mention of whether the work activity was done by
or at the direction of the insured~ The presence of this language in one exclusion
and the absence of this language in another exclusion is telling. The absence of
this language supports the conclusion that the policy did not intend to condition
the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion on whether any work was
undertaken by or on behalf of the insured.
(R., pp. 236-237.) The expression or inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another.

See Ace Realty Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,749,682 P.2d 1289, 1296 (Ct. App. 1984). If
Garrison had intended the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion to require that it apply
only when the loss/work was done "by or at the direction of' the insured, it could have borrowed
that language from the intentional loss exclusion. Garrison's failure to do so leads to a
reasonable inference that it did not intend to limit the faulty, inadequate or defective work
exclusion be limited to a loss arising out of work "by or at the direction" the insured. The
absence of that language in the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is indeed telling.
The clear and unambiguous language of the subject exclusion precludes adding Fisher's
words, terms, or conditions in order to avoid its application. The district court correctly refused
to add any words, te1ms or conditions to the exclusion. The district court should be affomed.
c.

Even if the Exclusion is Deemed Ambiguous and Interpreted to Include
Additional Words, Terms, or Conditions, the Exclusion Still Applies.
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Even if the Court adds Fisher's words, te1ms or conditions to the faulty, inadequate, or
defective work exclusion, the undisputed facts show that even with the added language, the
exclusion applies.

(1)

Fisher Authorized Work to be Done to the Dwelling.

The Lease-Purchase Agreement expressly and in writing authorized improvements and
repairs to the dwelling. (R., pp. 95-96, 105.) Fisher signed the Lease-Purchase Agreement.
Fisher admitted that she verbally authorized the tenant to fix the damage and rebuild the
dwelling. (R., pp. 164-165.) Even if"authorized" is added to the exclusion, that condition to the
application of the exclusion was met.
Fisher argues that she did not, however, authorize the destruction of the entire dwelling.
This merely expresses her dissatisfaction with the outcome of the authorized work. The fact that
the improvements led to damage she did not authorize simply defines the scope of the loss
(damages) rather than its cause. 2 Fisher authorized work to be done on the dwelling. That
authorized work involved workmanship, construction, repair, renovation, or remodeling. That
authorized work was faulty, inadequate, or defective. The exclusion applies even if authorization
is required.

2

For instance, under Fisher's interpretation of this added term, if Reynoso had, in the process of
doing the certain improvements she authorized damaged a load bearing wall causing the
dwelling to collapse, the exclusion would not apply because she did not authorize him to damage
the wall or cause the house to collapse. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the scope of the
exclusion, even if authorization is required.
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Regardless, it is undisputed that she authorized the tenant to "fix the damage" and
"rebuild" the dwelling. (R., pp. 164-165.) The failure to do so caused Fisher's ultimate loss - a
partially constructed dwelling. An unfinished, incomplete dwelling is faulty, inadequate or
defective construction or repair. To the extent authorization is required, the exclusion applies to
her loss.
(2)

The Work Was Done by or at the Direction of Fisher.

Fisher argues the exclusion only applies to work done by or at her direction. Similar to
authorizing Reynoso to do work, the work was done by or at Fisher's direction.
Fisher directed Reynoso' s use of subcontractors used in making the authorized
improvements to the dwelling by requiring all disbursements be made by TitleOne and that the
subcontractors sign lien-waivers. (R., p. 95.) Fisher directed Reynoso's work by requiring him
to give a monthly update for "plans/upgrades." (R., p. 96.) Fisher had the right to inspect the
premises. (R., p. 107.) Indeed, she monitored the reconstruction of the dwelling and questioned
the possible lien for concrete, a stop work order sign on the dwelling (''just checking to make
sure all is good"), and monitoring progress of the reconstruction. (R., pp. 168, 169, 170, 173.)
To the extent "by or at the direction" of Fisher is added to the exclusion, that condition was met.
(3)

Fisher had Knowledge that Work Would Be Done.

Fisher claims that she did not have knowledge that Reynoso would destroy the dwelling.
She has admitted, however, that she knew improvements would be done to the dwelling. (R., p.
164.) The fact that she did not know the final outcome of the work is of no consequence to the
application of the exclusion. At most, if knowledge is required, it would be knowledge of some
21

repair, construction, renovation or remodeling to the dwelling, not knowledge that this work
would be done in a faulty, inadequate, or defective manner.
Regardless, she had full knowledge of the repair and construction of the dwelling (and, in
fact, monitored its progress). She also had full knowledge that the repair or construction was not
completed. To the extent knowledge of the work done is required, she had it.
(4)

Fisher Had an Agreement With the Tenant to Do Work on the
Dwelling.

Fisher argues that she did not, however, hire Reynoso to demolish the dwelling or to
rebuild it. Fisher had a written agreement with the tenant to do improvements and major repairs
to the dwelling. (R., pp. 96, 105.) Fisher had an oral agreement with the tenant to repair the
damage and construct the dwelling. (R., p. 164.) Although the written agreement and oral
contract may not be traditional construction contracts, the work to be done under those
agreements (improvements, repairs, and rebuilding the house) provided consideration to both
parties. If Reynoso failed to close on the property before the Lease-Purchase Agreement
expired, all improvements forfeited to Fisher. (R., p. 96.) Improvements or repairs would
maintain or increase the value of Fisher's security (the dwelling). On the other hand, Reynoso's
work was done with the intent to sell the property for a profit. (R., p. 96.) If an agreement to do
the work is required, that condition was met.
Even if the faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion is interpreted to require that
Fisher authorize or direct the work, have knowledge that the work was being done, or have an
agreement or contractual undertaking to do the work, these conditions were met. She authorized,
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directed, had knowledge of, and had agreements to improve the property, make repairs to it, and
rebuild it. That she claims she did not authorize, direct, have knowledge of, or contractually
agree to destroy or leave the property unbuilt is irrelevant. The loss to the property, whether
labeled as its destruction or its lack of completion, merely defines the scope of the damage
caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship, repair, construction, renovation or
remodeling. Fisher's loss is excluded even under the expanded version of the exclusion.
d.

Case Law Relied on by Fisher Fails to Support the Non-Application of the
Faulty, Inadequate or Defective Work Exclusion; Other Case Law
Supports Application of the Exclusion.

Fisher relies on case law from foreign jurisdictions to support non-application to her loss
of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. Given the plain and unambiguous
language of the exclusion and the undisputed facts, there is no reason to resort to any case law to
dete1mine whether this exclusion applies to Fisher's loss. Applying the undisputed facts to the
plain meaning of the exclusion should end the analysis.
Nevertheless, the foreign jurisdiction case law does not support her arguments because:
(1) they are distinguishable on their facts; (2) they add words, terms or conditions to the
exclusion in contravention of contract construction rules; or (3) they support application of the
exclusion.
Fisher argues that the foreign jurisdiction case law upon which she relies stands for the
proposition that the plain meaning of the exclusion nmTows its application to losses where the
insured authorizes the work, does the work, or hires someone to do the work. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 17.)
23

The centerpiece of Fisher's foreign jurisdiction case law analysis is Husband v.

LaFayette Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 309 (La. 1994). In Husband, the Louisiana Court interpreted the
exclusion to apply to a situation where the insured, or someone authorized by the insured,
contracted to do the alterations to the property. Husband, 635 So. 2d at 311. Because in that
case the alterations were undertaken without authorization and in direct conflict with the te1ms of
the lease, the exclusion was found not to apply. Based on Husband, Fisher argues, the exclusion
here does not apply because the "destrnction" of the dwelling by Reynoso was not done at her
direction or with her authorization or pursuant to a contract.
The holding in Husband does not support non-application of the exclusion to Fisher's
loss .. First, Fisher had a written and oral agreement with Reynoso to make alterations to the
property. (R., pp. 96, 164-165.) These improvements to, and repair and rebuilding of, the
dwelling were authorized by Fisher. This authorization and contracted for work was done in a
faulty, inadequate or defective manner. Even under Husband, the exclusion applies.
Second, the Louisiana Court interpreted the exclusion to add words, terms and conditions
not found in its plain and unambiguous language. As discussed above, the exclusion does not
contain language that the work be undertaken by the insured or someone authorized by the
insured to do that work. Under Idaho rules of contract construction, there is no need to construe
the plain and unambiguous language of the exclusion and it violates rules of construction to add
terms and conditions to the exclusion, especially when similar terms and exclusions exist in a
different exclusion but not in the subject exclusion.

24

Third, Husband is factually distinguishable. In Husband, the insured had no knowledge
that any work was being done and made a claim only when the loss was discovered. Here,
Fisher knew some work (improvements) was happening. She had the right to inspect that work
and get periodic reports of its status. Moreover, Fisher knew about the repair and rebuild of the
dwelling before it happened. She monitored that work as it happened. She did not make a claim
upon "discovery" of the destruction of the dwelling. Indeed, she did not make a claim until after
the actual loss occurred - the incomplete repair and rebuild (for which she had complete
knowledge).
Fisher also relies on Home Savings ofAmerica, FS.B. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Cal.
App. 4th 835 (Ct. App. 2001). In Home Savings, the Court determined that the faulty,
inadequate or defective work exclusion did not exclude the loss caused by a third party's
intentional destruction of a residence. Home Savings, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 852. Fisher argues that
similarly, in this case, the loss caused by Reynoso's intentional destruction of the dwelling was
not excluded. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.)

Home Savings, however, is distinguishable. In Home Savings there was a total
destruction of the residence. The residence was destroyed for the sole purpose of redevelopment
without any intent to rebuild it. Here, there was no total destruction of the residence. (R., p.
118.) Here, the work was done to sell the property for a profit. (R., p. 96.) Here, there was a
clear intent to rebuild the dwelling, which process was in fact started. (R., p. 118.) In Home

Savings, the damages arose from the total destruction of the dwelling. Here, the damages arose
from an incomplete dwelling.
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Fisher also relies on Fidelity Co-Op Bank v. Nova Casualty Co., 726 F .3d 31 (1st Cir.
2013), because it relies on the language from Husband that a faulty workmanship exclusion was
"intended to prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to ensuring the quality of the
contractual undertaking by the insured or someone authorized by him." Fidelity Co-Op Bank,
726 F.3d at 38. Fidelity Co-Op is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the undisputed
evidence showed that the faulty workmanship (a roofrepair) occurred prior to the insured's
ownership. Here, the work was done during Fisher's ownership. Moreover, Fisher claims that
Fidelity Co-Op stands for the proposition that "[b ]ecause the work on the roof was not a
contractual undertaking by the insured or someone authorized by the insured, the exclusion did
not apply." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) However, the Fidelity Co-Op Court's reference to the
Husband language does not stand for the proposition that there must be a contractual undertaking
or authorization for the work that was faulty. Fidelity Co-Op was merely agreeing that the
exclusion was not intended to expand coverage to ensure the quality of construction. 3
Fisher argues that based on Husband, Home Savings, Fidelity Co-Op and 11 Essex, the
plain meaning of the exclusion applies only to situations where the insured, or someone
authorized by the insured, contracts for alterations to the property and is dissatisfied with the
quality or performance under the contract. (Appellant's Brief, p. 17.) That is the situation here.
Fisher authorized Reynoso in the written Lease-Purchase Agreement and the oral agreement to

Fisher also relies upon 11 Essex St. Corp. v. Tower Ins. Co. a/New York, 2005 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3556, 234 N.Y.L.J. 115 (S.C. New York 2005) because it quotes Husband. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 16.) This appears to be a trial court decision with no precedential or persuasive value.
Nor does this case add anything new to the discourse.
3
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make alterations to the property and was clearly dissatisfied with the quality of his performance.
These cases support application of the exclusion or are otherwise distinguishable.
Other cases have held that the exclusion applies regardless of the insured's authorization
of the work, involvement in the work done or knowledge that the work had occurred. These
cases also held that the language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear
and unambiguous, thereby precluding an interpretation of the exclusion that adds words, terms or
conditions.
In Wilson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 102 Cal.App.4th 1171 (Ct. App. 2002), the insured
submitted a claim for the loss in the value of their house resulting from an unfinished renovation
project. Id at 1172. The Wilson Court upheld summary judgment that the loss was expressly
excluded from coverage as a loss caused by inadequate repair, construction, renovation, or
remodeling. Id The Court held "[a]n unfinished renovation or remodeling project that leaves
the house in disrepair is plainly 'inadequate."' Id at 1174.
The Wilson Court distinguished Home Savings for two reasons. First, the Wilson Court
determined that the exclusion was not limited to loss caused by "faulty construction" but "applies
more broadly to any loss caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship, repair,
construction, renovation, or remodeling." Id at 1175.
Second, the Wilson Court distinguished Home Savings based on factual distinctions
specifically the insured home in Home Savings was not simply renovated or remodeled, it was
completely destroyed and was destroyed by a third pmiy entirely without the mortgagee bank's
knowledge. Id at 1175.
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Here [in Wilson], on the other hand, plaintiffs reasonably should have known a
renovation project undertaken by or on behalf of the named insured with their
knowledge, which involved some demolition but not the complete destruction of
the house, gave rise to a risk that ivas excluded from coverage under the
"inadequate renovation" exclusion. The risk was that the renovation or
remodeling would be performed defectively or inadequately, leaving the house in
a state of disrepair that reduced its value. This is exactly the sort of risk of loss
expressly encompassed by the "inadequate renovation" exclusion, and exactly the
sort of loss plaintiffs suffered when Wampler abandoned his renovation of the
house before it was completed.
Id. at 1176.

Like Wilson, Fisher should have reasonably known that the improvement project
undertaken with her knowledge, which necessarily involved some demolition, 4 might give rise to
a risk excluded by the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. The risk was that
Reynoso's improvements would be performed defectively or inadequately leaving the dwelling
in a state of disrepair (even total disrepair) that reduced its value.
Like Wilson, Fisher should also have reasonably known that repairing the damage and
rebuilding the dwelling might give rise to a risk excluded by the faulty, inadequate or defective
work exclusion. The risk here was that Reynoso's repair and rebuild would be performed
inadequately or defectively leaving the dwelling in a state of disrepair that reduced the value of
the dwelling. This is exactly the sort of risk of loss encompassed by the faulty, inadequate or
defective work exclusion and exactly the loss suffered when Reynoso abandoned the repair and
rebuild before the dwelling was completed.

Even "cosmetic" improvements involving flooring and countertops require demolition of the
old flooring and counte1iops.

4
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The Wilson Court ultimately determined that the loss fell within the scope of the faulty,
inadequate or defective work exclusion, as a matter of law, because:
Where, as here, the named insured or someone authorized by the named insured
engages in renovation or remodeling with the knowledge and approval of the
mortgagee, the "inadequate renovation" exclusion precludes the mortgagee who is
later dissatisfied with the quality of the insured's performance of the renovation
from claiming coverage because the renovation has left the property worth less
than it was before.

Id. at 1177.
Like Wilson, Fisher authorized Reynoso to engage in renovation or remodeling
(improvements) with her knowledge and approval. She was later dissatisfied with the quality of
Reynoso's perfo1mance of the improvements (renovation and remodeling). As in Wilson, the
exclusion applies because the improvements left the property worth less than it was before.
Like Wilson, Fisher authorized Reynoso to engage in repair and construction of the
dwelling with her knowledge and approval. That repair and construction was begun but was not
completed. Fisher was dissatisfied with the quality of Reynoso' s performance of the repair and
construction. As in Wilson, the exclusion applies to the incomplete repair and construction
because the property was worth less than it was before.
In Stephens v. Liberty Mutual, 2008 WL 480287 (N.D.Cal. 2008), the federal district
court, in an umepo1ied case, determined that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion
is not ambiguous. Id. at * 14. The Stephens Court also held, the application of the exclusion does
not depend on whether the insured or any third party authorized the construction or hired the
contractor. Id. at * 15.

29

In Stephens, the Court further noted that the insured "never agreed or contracted to have
its building struck with heavy machinery, used for storage of construction material, or damaged
as a result of the negligent activity of the Olympic Club or Plant Construction." Id. The

Stephens Court rejected that argument and applied the exclusion. Similarly, Fisher argues the
exclusion does not apply here because she never agreed or contracted to have Reynoso "destroy"
the dwelling. This argument should also be rejected.
In analyzing a similar faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion the Court in

Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 990 P.2d 414 (Wash.App. 1999), noted "[a]n insured may
not avoid a contractual exclusion merely by affixing an additional label or separate
characterization to the act or event causing the loss." Capelouto, 990 P.2d at 418. Rather, courts
must tum to general principles governing the interpretation of the insurance contracts, including
examining the ordinary meaning of the terms used. Id. Here, Fisher attempts to avoid the
exclusion by labeling or characterizing the act or event causing the loss as destroying the
property. The Capelouto Court suggests that these gratuitous labels or characterizations be
ignored in favor of more accurate words to describe the act or event causing the loss - here,
remodeling, renovating, repair and construction. Ultimately, the Capelouto Court determined
that the "plain meaning of the exclusion indicates that the claimed loss, damage caused by a
contractor's use of an inadequate pump on a sewer replacement project off the insured's
premises, is not covered." Id. at 418.
Case law from foreign jurisdictions analyzing or interpreting similar exclusions need not
be consulted. The language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear and
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unambiguous and the undisputed facts must be applied to the plain meaning of that language.
That language does not include words, terms or conditions requiring Fisher to authorize or direct
the alterations to the property, contract with a third party to do the alterations or have knowledge
of exactly what work is going to be done before it is performed. Even if foreign case law is
consulted, those cases that are more factually analogous to the present case and do not construe
or interpret the exclusion to include words, terms or conditions not expressly stated therein
support application of the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion to Fisher's loss.

IV. CONCLUSION.
Garrison respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment and dismissal of Fisher's Complaint on the grounds that her loss is excluded from
coverage by the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion.
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d. weight of contents, equipment. animals

or people;
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof;
f. use of defective material or methods in
construction, remodeling or renovation
if the collapse occurs during the course
of the construction, remodeling or
renovation.
Loss to ail awning, fence, patio, pavement.
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue,
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation,
retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock
is not lnclcded under items b, c, d, e and f
unless the loss Is a direct result of the
collapse of a bullding.
Collapse does not include settling, cracking,
shrinking, bulging or expansion.
· This coverage does not Increase the limit of
liability applying to the damaged covered
property.

11. Glass or Safety Glazing Material. We
cover:
a. the breakage of glass or safety glazing
material which is part of a covered
building, storm door or storm window;
and
b. damage to covered property by glass or
safety grazing material which is pan of a
building, storm door or storm window.
This coverage does not Include loss on the
Described location If the dwentng has been
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days
immediately before the loss. A dwelling
being constructed ls not considered vacant
Loss for damage to glass will be settled on
the basis of replacement with safety glazing
materials when required by ordinance or
law.
This coverage does not increase the limit of
liabnity that applies to the damaged
property.

PERILS INSURED AGAINST
COVERAGE A - DWELLING and
COVERAGE B - OTHER STRUCTURES
1Wi Jntt,Jfe loss - to
property cfescrlbed ·rn ·coverages ·A and B only
If tlia~ .. loss
a ·pliysfcal loss fo property;
Insure
however. We
: - .....- ... .
1. involving collapse, other than as provided In
Other Coverages 1 O:

(2) foundation,
retaining
bulkhead; or
(3) pier, wharf or dock;

zig~rrisc1tsi<. ·,1:ii: di~t·
rs
do not

. loss:

2, caused by.
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system or of a household
appliance, or by discharge, leakage or
overflow from within the system or
appliance caused by freezing. This
exclusion applies only while the dwelling
unoccupied or being
Is vacant,
constructed unless you have used
reasonable care to:

.(1} maintain heat In the building: or
(2} shut off the water supply and drain
the system and appliances of water;
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of
water or Ice. whether driven by wind or
not, to a:
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming
pool:

wa!I

or

c. theft of property not part of. a covered
building or structure;
·
d. theft In or to a dwelling or structure
under construction:
e. wind, hail, Ice. snow or sleet to:
(1} outdoor
radio
and
television
antennas and aerials including their
lead-In wiring. masts or towers: or
(2) trees, shrubs, plants or lawns;
vandalism and malicious mischief, theft
or attempted theft .If the awelling has
been ·vacant for more than 30
ci:insec~ve cf~ys immediately before the
loss. A dwelling being constructed is not
considered vacant;
g. constant or repeated seepage or
leakage or water or steam over a period
of weeks, months or years from within
a plumbing, heating. air conditioning or
automatic fire protective sprinkler
system or from within a household
appliance;

f.

h. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration,
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vice,
latent
defect,
mechanical breakdown;
(31 smog, rust or other corrosion, mold,
wet or dry rot;
(2) inherent

(4) smoke From agricultural smudging or

Industrial operations;

(5) discharge,

dispersal,
seepage.
release or escape of

migration
pollutants.
Pollutants means any solld, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals
and waste. Waste includ~s • materials
to be recycled. reconditioned or
reclaimed;
(6) settling. ·shrinking. bulging or expan-

sion. including resultant cracking. of
pavements,
patios,
foundations.
walls, floors. roofs or ceilings; or
(7) birds. vermin. rodents, insects or
domestic animals.
If any of these cause •..vater damage not
otherwise excluded, from a plumbing,
heating, air conditioning or automatic
fire protective sprinkler system or
household appliance, we cover loss
caused by L"le water including the cost
of tearing out and replacing any part of
a building necessary to repc!ir the
system or appliance. We do not cover
Joss to the system or appliance from
which this water escaped.
3. excluded under General Exclusions.

Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to
property described in Coverages A and B not
excluded or excepted in this polfcy is covered.

. COVERAGE C - PERSONAL PROPERTY
We Insure for direct physical loss to the
property described In Coverage C caused by a
peril listed below unless the loss is excluded in
the General Exclusions.
1. Fire or lightning.

2. Windstorm or hall.
This peril does not include loss to
a.

property contained in a build ng caused
by rain. snow, sleet. sand or dust unless
the direct force of wind or hail damages
the bulld,ng causing an opening in a roof
or wall and the rain. snow, sleet, sand or
dust enters through this opening:

b. canoes and rowboats; or
trees, shrubs or plants.

c.

3. Explosion.

4. Riot or civil commotion.
5. Aircraft, lncludfng self-propelled missiles
and spacecraft.

6. Vehicles.

7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental
damage from smoke.
This peril does not Include Joss caused by
smoke from agricultural smudging or
Industrial operations.

8. Vandalism or malicious mischief.
This peril does not Include loss by pilferage,
theft. burglary or larceny.

9. Damage by Burglars, meaning damage to
covered property caused by Burglars.
This peril does not Include;
a theft of property; or
b. damage caused by burglars to property
on the Described Location if the
dwelllng has been vaca·nt For more than
30 consecutive days Immediately before
the damage occurs. A dwelling being
constructed is not considered vacant.
10. Falling Objects.
This peril does not include loss to property
contained In the bulld[ng unless the roof or
an outside wall of the buifdlng is first
damaged by a falling object
Damage to the falling oftiect itself Is not
covered.
11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes
damage to property contained in the
building.
12. Accidental discharge or overflow of
water or steam from within a plumbing,
heating. air conditioning or automatic fire
protective sprinkler system or From within a
household appliance.
This peril does not lndude loss:
a. to the system or appliance from which
the water or steam escaped;
b

caused by or resulting from freezing
except as provided In the peril of
freezing below: or
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c. on the Described Location caused by
accidental discharge or overflow which
occurs off the Described location.
In this peril, a plumbing system does not
include a sump, sump pump or related
equipment

13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart,
cracking, burning or bulging of a steam or
hot water f!eating system, an air conditioning
or automatic fire protective sprinkie,
system, or an appUance for heating water.
This peril does not include loss caused by
or resulting from freezing except as
provided in the peril of freezing below.

14. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic fire protective
sprfnkler system or of a household
appliance.

This peril does not Include loss on the
Described Location INhile the dwelling Is
unoccupied or being constructed, unless
you have used reasonable care to:
a.

maintain heat In the buflding; or

b. shut off the water supply and drain the
system and appliances of water.

15. Sudden

and accidental damage from
artificially generated electrical current.

This peril does not include loss to a tube,
transistor or similar electronic component.

16. Volcanic Eruption other than loss caused
by earthquake. land shock waves or
tremors.

GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1. We do not Insure for loss caused directly

or lndfrectly by any of the foffowlng. Such
loss Is excluded regardless of any other
1 cause or event contributing concurrently or
in any sequence .to the loss.
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating
the use. construction,
repair, or
demolition of a building or other
structure, unless specifically provided
under this policy.
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake
including land shock waves or tremors
before, during or after a volcanic
eruption; landslide: mine subsidence:
mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting;
unless direct loss by:
(1) fire;

(2) water which backs up through
sewers
or
drains
or
which
overflows from a sump; or

(3) water below the surface of the
ground, Including water which exerts
pressure on or seeps or leaks
through
a
building.
sidewalk,
driveway,
foundation,
s..yirnming _
poof or other structure.
Direct loss by fire or explosion resulting
from water damage is covered.
· d. Power Failure, meaning the failure of
power or. other utility service If the
failure takes pli:ice off the Described
Location. But, If a Peril Insured Against
ensues on the Described Location, we
will pay only for that ensuing loss.

e. Neglect, meaning your neglect to use all

(2} explosion; or

(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing
material which Is part of a building.
storm door or storm window;
ensues and then we will pay only for the
ensuing loss.
c. Water Damage, meaning:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal

water, overflow of a body of water,
or spray from any of these. whether
or not driven by wind;

reasonable means to save and preserve
property at and after the time of a loss.

f, War, Including undeclared war, civil war,
insurrection,
rebellion,
revolution,
warlike act by a military force or mlfitary
personnel, destruction or seizure or use
for a military purpose, and Including any
consequence of any of these. Discharge
of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a
warlike act even If accidental.

g. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth
In the Nuclear Hazard Clause of the
Conditions.
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Intentional Loss, meaning any loss

. arisi(lg ·dutof ~ny act c6m'mltted:

(1) by or at the qirec;tlon of you or any
.~i'§on or ofgarilziitlon named as an
ai;fffj~lqnal insured: and
(2) with the Intent to cause a loss.

b. Acts or decisions, including the failure
to act or decide, of any person, group,
organization or governmental body;
C, f~·@:y, ·,n.adequ"°~te or d~fective;
(1) planning,
zoning,
surveying. si~ing;

development,

(~J d~igq:··sp~cJfi~tlons, workmanship,

2. We do not insure for loss to property
described fn Coverages A and B caused by
any of the following. However\ any ensuing
, loss to property described In Coverages A
arid B not excluded or excepted in this
policy Is covered.
a. Weather conditions.
However, this
exclusion only applies if weather
conditions contribute In any way with a
cause or event excluded In paragraph 1.
above to produce the loss;

_rfil:,jl_r. ~911?l'11¢Jlc;m, renovation,
·.=eroooellng,
__ ..,...- .. i:iracllng,
- . compaction;
(3) materials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling: or
(4) maintenance;
of part or all of any property whether
on or off the Described Location.

CONDITIONS
Policy Period. This policy applies only to
loss which occurs during the policy period.
Z. Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability.
Even If more th,m one person has an
insurable interest In the property covered,
we will not be liable In any one loss:

1.

a. for an amount greater than the Interest
of a person insured under this policy; or

b.

.,

for more than the applicable limit of
liability

3. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy
will be void if. whether before or after a
loss, you have:
a. intentionally concealed or mlsrepre; sented
any
material
fact
or
circumstance:
b. engaged In fraudulent conduct; or
c. made false statements;
relating to this insurance.

c. prepare an inventory of damaged
personal property showing the quantity,
description, actual cash value and
amount of loss. Attach all bllls, receipts
and related documents that Justify the
figures in the inventory;
d. as often as we reasonably require:
(1) show the damaged property;

(2) provide us with records and
documents we request and permit us
to rnake copies; and
(3) submit to examination under oath,
while not in the presence of any
other named Insured, and sign the
same;
e. send to us, within 60 days after our
request, your signed, sworn proof of
loss which sets forth, to the best of
your knowledge and belief:
(1) the time and cause of loss;

4. Your Duties Arter Loss. In case of a loss
to covered property, you must see that the
following are done

(2) your Interest and that of all others in
the property Involved and all liens on

a • give prompt notice to us or our agent:
b. '. (1) protect the property from further
damage:

(3) other insurance which may cover the

the property;
loss:

(2) make

reasonable and necessary
repairs to protect the property; and

(4) changes In title or occupancy of the
property during the term of the
pollcy:

(3) keep an accurate record of repair
expenses;

(5) specifications of damaged buildings
and detailed repair estimates;
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